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Abstract
Use of optimization models in science and policy applications is often problematic because the best available
models are very inaccurate representations of the originating problems. Such is the case with electoral
districting models, for which there exist no generally accepted measures of compactness, in spite of many
proposals and much analytical study. This article reports on an experimental investigation of subjective
judgments of compactness for electoral districts. The experiment draws on a unique database of 116 distinct,
legally valid districting plans for the Philadelphia City Council, discovered with evolutionary computation.
Subjects in the experiment displayed, in the aggregate, remarkable agreement with several standard measures
of compactness, thus providing warrant for use of these measures that has heretofore been unavailable. The
exercise also lends support to the underlying methodology on display here, which proposes to use models
based on subjective judgments in combination with algorithms that find multiple solutions in order to support
application of optimization models in contexts in which they are only very approximate representations.
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Abstract
Use of optimization models in science and policy applications is often problematic because the best
available models are very inaccurate representations of the originating problems. Such is the case with
electoral districting models, for which there exist no generally accepted measures of compactness, in spite
of many proposals and much analytical study. This paper reports on an experimental investigation of
subjective judgments of compactness for electoral districts. The experiment draws on a unique database of
116 distinct, legally valid districting plans for the Philadelphia City Council, discovered with evolutionary
computation. Subjects in the experiment displayed, in the aggregate, remarkable agreement with several
standard measures of compactness, thus providing warrant for use of these measures that has heretofore
been unavailable. The exercise also lends support to the underlying methodology on display here, which
proposes to use models based on subjective judgments in combination with algorithms that find multiple
solutions in order to support application of optimization models in contexts in which they are only very
approximate representations.
Keywords: systems design, evolutionary design, emotive design, genetic algorithms, evolutionary comput-
ing, districting, zone design, compactness, redistricting, reapportionment, interactive evolutionary computing
1 Introduction
Advances in articulating and solving constrained optimization models often lead to progress in science and
progress in solving real-world design problems. Better algorithms for finding optimal solutions, however, can
∗This is a slightly extended version of (Chou et al., 2013), containing archival and other material excluded from the SSCR
version for lack of space.
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do little to address real-world problems if the models themselves are very inaccurate representations of the
originating problems. In the face of model inaccuracies we have basically three choices, each of which may
be appropriate depending upon circumstances:
1. Do the best we can in building the model, obtain an optimal solution for it, act on an optimal solution,
and hope for the best.
2. Insist on an accurate model, then wait to decide until one is available and has a solution.
3. Use the admittedly flawed model to support discussion and deliberation, implementing a modification
of an optimal solution to the model in response to considerations not fully represented in the model.
Recent work, undertaken in the context of the design of electoral districts, has led to a promising technique
in conjunction with the third option, aimed at making the option more attractive in cases where the proposal
can be applied (Chou et al., 2012; Gopalan et al., 2013, 2012a). The proposal is designed for cases in which
it is problematic to define and parameterize an objective function mathematically, yet human subjective
judgments can distinguish better and worse solutions. Such cases are, perhaps surprisingly, common, as
the extensive literature in so-called interactive evolutionary computation (IEC) attests. (The IEC idea
originated in The Blind Watchmaker, (Dawkins, 1985). See (Chou et al., 2012; Takagi, 2001) for overview
and references on subsequent developments.) Not surprisingly, the downside of relying on human subjective
judgments for selecting the good solutions from a large pool of solutions is human fatigue and consequent
failures of discrimination. Takagi and Iba (2005) call this “the most pressing problem in IEC systems.”
As a partial remedy to this problem, Chou et al. (2012) propose what they call validated surrogate
fitness (VSF) functions. The nub of the idea is simple: (a) use human subjective judgment to validate
a mathematical function that approximates the choices humans make when confronted with the pool of
solutions to be considered; (b) use the mathematical function (as the VSF) during automated search (for
optimal solutions); (c) produce by automated search a plurality of good solutions (according to the model);
and (d) offer these good solutions as members of a consideration set for subsequent deliberation. (Points (c)
and (d) instantiate the more general concept of solution pluralism (Kimbrough et al., 2011).)
While we agree that the VSF idea ((a)–(d), sketched above) has much to recommend it, the supporting
evidence presented in (Chou et al., 2012) was rather modest, as we shall see. The purpose of this research
note is to report on an experiment that augments the unusual, even unique, data set produced by (Chou
et al., 2012) and investigates the core idea more thoroughly. §2 succinctly presents necessary background.
§3 then presents the experiment and discusses the results. We conclude in §4 with some brief comments.
2 Essential Background
Our context is the design of electoral districts. In the United States, after each census it is usually neces-
sary to redraw the boundaries of electoral districts in order to maintain approximately equal populations
among them. The process is called (re)districting or reapportionment. It is fraught—contentious and
consequential—because there are often many legally valid ways to draw the boundaries of the districts, but
different designs will favor different interests. Attracting considerable public attention of late, e.g.,(Draper,
2012; Wang, 2013a,b), the universal worry is that when it comes to reapportionment those in power will
normally attend to their own interests ahead of the public’s. The question, “And will elected politicians use
redistricting to pick their voters, instead of the other way around?” (Altman and Klass, 2005), voices an
often-repeated worry that advances in information technology will serve to work against the public interest.
The literature is enormous; see, e.g., (Altman et al., 2005; Cain, 1984; Cox and Katz, 2002; Turner and
Lamacchia, 1999) for useful reviews.
Electoral districts that are oddly shaped for the purpose of benefitting some party, cause, or even individ-
ual (a common occurrence) are said to be gerrymandered.1 There is widespread agreement that gerryman-
dering is not in the public’s interest. Among other things, this has led to efforts to get the public involved
by encouraging the development and publicizing of districting proposals by the general public in hopes that
putting better plans in play will lead to better outcomes, e.g., (Satullo, 2011).
The antidote to interest-based designs, as in gerrymandering, is generally seen to be an objective, disin-
terested basis for designing electoral districts. But how? Gerrymandered districts are often apparent to the
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eye because they sprawl and meander in seemingly arbitrary ways. They are not tight and tidy. To use the
common term, they are not compact. The received hope has been to find an objective measure of compact-
ness, which may then be used to assess districting plans (Cox and Katz, 2002; Niemi et al., 1990; Young,
1988) (see also (Fryer, Jr. and Holden, 2011, pages 497–8), (Altman and McDonald, 2012), and (Niemi et al.,
1990, pages 1156–7), which summarize court sympathies with using some measure of compactness).2 Points
arising:
1. If an objectively assessable measure of compactness could be agreed upon as the objective in reappor-
tionment, then it would be possible in principle to conduct search and optimization by computer to
find good designs. One would minimize the compactness measure (assume smaller is better), subject to
legal constraints on contiguity and population size ((Cox and Katz, 2002; Kalcsics et al., 2005; Young,
1988); see (Gopalan et al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2012) and references therein for background on the
problem in the history of operations research).
2. There is in fact no general agreement regarding measures of compactness for reapportionment. Young
(1988) argues in detail that all standard measures of compactness have serious flaws, and hence there
can be no mathematical or a priori basis for choosing among them. In a follow-on study, Niemi et al.
(1990) support and extend Young’s findings. They conclude that combining multiple measures of
compactness should be explored as a possible solution. But they do not develop this idea and, to
our knowledge, it remains only a suggestion. In short, Young’s views have been widely accepted. As
Fryer, Jr. and Holden (2011, page 494) note, “There is no consensus on how to adequately measure
compactness.”3
3. Even if agreement on the definition of compactness for reapportionment purposes could be had, lim-
iting the objective of the optimization to compactness is problematic, since other objectives, such as
protection of neighborhood integrity (Fryer, Jr. and Holden, 2011; Satullo, 2011), are often important.
This last point is addressed in a principled way by point (d) in the VSF concept (above). The first point
offers a hope if points 2 and 3 can be resolved favorably. So, we are left with addressing point 2: the problem
of finding a measure of compactness that can be used in automated search and optimization and that is
sufficiently warranted to serve as a surrogate for human judgment.
Given Young’s analyses (Young, 1988), the justification for a compactness measure will have to be an
empirical one, yet, there is very little such work available. This takes us to the paper by Chou et al. (2012).
Further points arising:
4. Besides proposing the VSF concept, Chou et al. (2012) succeeded in the technically challenging task of
producing 116 good solutions for a difficult districting problem (point (c), above).4 Every design was
required to allocate each of 66 wards to one of ten councilmanic districts for the City of Philadelphia,
using data from the 2010 census. In consequence, the raw search space, assuming assignment of at
least one ward to each of the ten districts, is sized as a Stirling number of the second kind, S(66, 10) ≈
2.7295 × 1059. They used evolutionary computation to produce this pool of legally feasible solutions
by minimizing on a measure of compactness, subject to feasibility on contiguity and population size.
5. The measure of compactness used by Chou et al. (2012) was the max-max distance. Their optimization
sought to minimize the maximum of the largest intra-district distance within a plan. This is very much
a non-standard measure of compactness, use of which was necessitated by the information available at
the time.
6. Further, Chou et al. (2012) undertook three experiments that gave qualified support from human
judgments for use of this compactness measure as a VSF in the context of electoral districting. Using
paired comparisons of district plans that were chosen to be well separated in terms of the max-max
distance measure, they were able to show, across 3 experiments, a discernible level of agreement between
comparative compactness judgments of the subjects and the verdicts of the max-max distance metric.
We conjecture that a main reason why careful empirical studies have not heretofore been done on measures
of compactness for electoral districts is that there have not been libraries of alternative plans available for
comparison. In fact, reporting of the production of the 116 plans, and how this was achieved, was, with
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the VSF idea, the main thrust of (Chou et al., 2012). Given their quite limited and provisional empirical
results—items (5) and (6) just above—it becomes important to test the VSF idea on standard measures of
compactness. That is just what our experiment was designed to do.
3 Experiment 4
Chou et al. (2012) report three experiments on human judgment of compactness, using maps (district plans)
drawn from the 116 produced by their evolutionary algorithm. Their experiment 2 is not directly comparable
to our experiment and so we will not discuss it further. In their first and third experiments, the same four pairs
of district plans were presented to subjects who were asked to yield judgments of comparative compactness.
In terms of table 1, subjects were asked to choose between maps (1 & 2), (3 & 4), (5 & 6), and (7 & 8)
with regard to compactness. Most importantly, subjects were asked to choose on the basis of what they
judged most other people would think with regard to the comparative compactness. Further, subjects were
rewarded based on the number of choices they made that agreed with the majority. This is called a beauty
contest design; it provides incentive for the subjects to report honestly and thoughtfully. Experiment 1 was
performed in a laboratory setting; experiment 3 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). The
results of the two experiments were in good agreement.
Our experiment 4 extended experiment 3 on AMT. We used the same basic setup with these modifications.
1. Subjects were asked to choose between 8 pairs of maps (numbered 1–16), instead of 4, as in experiment
3 (and experiment 1).
2. Maps 1–8 (and pairings) were as in experiment 3 (and experiment 1). Maps 9–16 were paired in the
same pattern, now: (9 & 10), (11 & 12), (13 & 14), and (15 & 16).5
3. Maps 9–16 were randomly drawn anew. Note especially that, unlike maps 1–8, they were not selected
to be far apart in objective values. (All 16 maps were drawn without replacement.)
4. Subjects were paid $0.20 to complete the task, with a bonus of $2.00 for 7 or 8 agreements with the
group, and $1.00 for 5 or 6.
5. Maps 1 and 2 were presented paired in random order, maps 3 and 4 were presented paired in random
order, etc.
6. We limited participation to 200 subjects, each of whom recorded judgments on the 8 pairs of maps.
Of these subjects, 20 made 8 judgments that agreed with the majority vote in each case, 38 judged
correctly in 7 of the 8 cases, 30 got 6 of the 8 right, and 22 got 5 of 8 right.
Table 1 presents the key data from the experiment, along with other information, including the results
of experiments 1 and 3. Points arising:
1. The column labeled “Exp. 4” presents the votes received by individual maps in the pair comparisons.
The column labeled “Objective” records the max-max distance score of the associated map. Recall that
lower scores are (presumably or hypothetically) associated with better compactness, where the max-
max distance consists of finding the largest distance between two points in a district and finding the
maximum of those distances over all districts. The votes are all in the “right” direction and consistent
with the results of experiments 1 and 3. The p-values are significant in each case: 0.0280 (map 1–map
2 pairing), 7.0085e-04 (maps 3–4), 4.1640e-07 (maps 5–6), and 2.4865e-05 (maps 7–8).
2. The votes are not in the “right” direction for the max-max distance measure of compactness for the
pairings maps 9–10, maps 11–12, and maps 15–16. The voting differences, however, are significant
with p-values of 0.0097 (maps 9–10), 0.0018 (maps 11–12), 7.5353e-09 (maps 13–14), and 0.0141 (maps
15–16). Note that in these cases the objective values of the compared maps are much closer together
than in the earlier comparisons. This suggests that max-max distance is not salient or “right” for
subjects in judging compactness when the compared values are too close together.
4
Map Exp. 1 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Totals Objective Avg. Schwartzberg Distance2 Perimeter
1 19 83 114 216 341.62 1.678 138.8407 220.03
2 0 54 86 140 399.34 1.845 176.3282 240.28
3 17 73 123 213 346.57 1.761 144.4725 231.35
4 3 64 77 144 399.34 1.840 179.9436 239.65
5 4 58 65 127 399.34 1.847 179.1198 240.50
6 15 79 135 229 346.57 1.666 136.0053 218.68
7 13 86 129 228 346.57 1.677 137.2534 219.89
8 7 51 71 129 391.26 1.709 153.2877 224.81
9 117 117 377.46 1.645 134.7425 216.23
10 83 83 365.49 1.706 136.2504 224.71
11 79 79 369.43 1.831 170.4763 238.10
12 121 121 378.46 1.669 136.1410 219.48
13 140 140 367.58 1.757 146.2849 230.66
14 60 60 399.34 1.894 191.8305 246.67
15 84 84 355.37 1.787 165.1738 230.90
16 116 116 377.46 1.705 136.6441 223.90
Table 1: Summary of results, experiments 1, 3, and 4. (Perimeters given in miles.)
3. Using manual tracing, assisted by computer, we obtained the perimeters and areas of each of the
10 districts in each of the 16 maps. The perimeter values are reported in table 1 in the column
labeled “Perimeter.” Both the perimeter and the area values were used in computing the Schwartzberg
measure, shown in the column labeled “Avg. Schwartzberg.” Thus, we augmented the data available
in (Chou et al., 2012).
4. The Schwartzberg measure of compactness is the ratio of the perimeter of a district divided by the
perimeter of the circle having the same area as the district. Lower values indicate more compact
districts on this measure. In the table, in the column labeled “Avg. Schwartzberg,” we report the sum
of the Schwartzberg measures for each district in the corresponding map, divided by the number of
districts (10 in the case of Philadelphia).
5. There is perfect agreement between the Schwartzberg measure and the majority voting results in
experiments 1, 3, and 4.
6. There is perfect agreement between the Perimeter measure and the majority voting in experiments 1,
3, and 4 (and with Schwartzberg).
7. The column labeled “Distance2” in table 1 records the (square of the) total Euclidean distances in each
design/map between the centroids of the districts and the centers of their constituent wards. This is a
commonly-used compactness metric (often called the center of gravity measure), with smaller numbers
indicating better values. (This information was in fact available at the time of writing of (Chou et al.,
2012), but was not used.)
8. There is perfect agreement between the Distance2 measure and the majority voting in experiments 1, 3,
and 4 (and with Schwartzberg and Perimeter). Of course, Distance itself would preserve the agreement
as well. The (Pearson) correlation coefficient between the average Schwartzberg measure and Distance
(square root of Distance2) is 0.9570, suggesting that while these are indeed different measures, they
will be largely equivalent for practical purposes.
9. On the basis of these results we find support for the hypotheses that the Schwartzberg measure, the
Perimeter measure, and the Distance measure can be used as VSFs in districting because they accord
well with human subject judgment. Of course, we have no data to rule out possible measures of
compactness, other than max-max distance.
10. We find it plausible that human subjects are sensing and judging on the basis of the Perimeter measure,
rather than Schwartzberg, which we suspect is harder to sense and intuit. This, however, is only a
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conjecture and will need to be tested experimentally. Similarly, whether subjects rely on Distance or
Perimeter (or neither or a combination) remains to be tested.
11. Interestingly, the favorite map of Chou et al. (2012), shown in figure 2 of (Chou et al., 2012), has
a Distance2 score of 132.2226, which is the lowest of the 116 maps we discovered. This is a fact we
encountered after Chou et al. (2012) selected the map as the best of the bunch.
12. Figure 1 shows gray scale versions of maps 9 and 10, which subjects were asked to compare on compact-
ness. (Of the 116 maps discovered, 107 were produced in color. These maps may be found at http://
opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/phillydistricts/doc/TeamFred_CompleteMaps.pdf.) Note that
on the max-max distance criterion (in the “Objective” column) map 10 has a lower score than map
9 and hence is counted as more compact by this criterion. The voting, however, is 117 to 83 in favor
of map 9. As noted earlier, the average Schwartzberg, the Distance2, and the Perimeter measures all
agree with the voting in counting map 9 as more compact than map 10. We find this a remarkable
performance by our Mechanical Turk subjects.
13. Figure 2 shows gray scale versions of maps 15 and 16, which subjects were asked to compare on
compactness. Note that on the max-max distance criterion (in the “Objective” column) map 15 has a
lower score than map 16 and hence is counted as more compact by this criterion. The voting, however,
is 116 to 84 in favor of map 16. As noted earlier, the average Schwartzberg, the Distance2, and the
Perimeter measures all agree with the voting in counting map 16 as more compact than map 15. Again,
we find this a remarkable performance by our Mechanical Turk subjects.
4 Discussion
The problem of compactness—of defining it, of using it—is central to the problem of avoiding malapportion-
ment in electoral districting. Yet, as we have noted, it is beset with difficulties. In his review of compactness
measures for districting, Young concludes that “compactness is such a hazy and ill-defined concept that it
seems impossible to apply it, in any rigorous sense, to matters of law” (Young, 1988, page 113). This is
widely accepted, with the following passage reflecting the received view.
Compactness refers to the shape of a district, but is formally ill-defined. Scholars have proposed
over fifty compactness measures, which have not resulted in clarity, since these measures conflict
and can be manipulated. (Altman and McDonald, 2012, page 1190)
The approach we have sketched may well afford keeping the baby without the bath water. Young’s analysis
presumes that the standard measures of compactness are to be assessed in an absolute fashion. If so, then we
would agree that the contingencies of geography and policy will defeat any attempt to mandate a threshold
score for compactness on any known measure. But there is an alternative. The perspective we would
urge is to use them in a relative or comparative sense. We should judge a districting plan as (relatively)
compact based on measure M if it scores well compared to relevant alternative plans, the relevant plans
being that plurality of known solutions that are legally valid and have generally good scores for compactness
(comparatively). If one or a pool of compactness measures can be empirically validated, then surely the move
we have indicated of focusing discussion on the better-scoring solutions could be used at the least to shift
the burden of argument onto those who would advocate significant departures. Very many extant districting
plans are in fact in this category. Compare the maps above.
Questions that naturally arise in consequence include: (1) How do disinterested human subjects judge
compactness of electoral districts and to what extent do these judgments agree with established measures
of compactness? (2) How might pooled judgments regarding compactness be used to improve the reappor-
tionment process? Regarding (1), as the following passage attests, the advisability of undertaking empirical
assessment of districting plans and methods is becoming recognized.
The development of a new generation of software, such as our DistrictBuilder system [http:
//www.districtbuilder.org/, last visited 2013-03-03], has enabled members of the public to
create hundreds of real districting plans—plans based on official census data, and satisfying all of
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the criteria required by law. The existence of this large corpus of redistricting plans for the first
time is beginning to enable an empirical analysis of redistricting plans that both expands our
understanding of the range of redistricting outcomes that are feasible in practice, and illuminates
the trade-offs that members of the public tend to view as most desirable. (Altman and McDonald,
2012, page 1197)
The experiment we report here is among the first, if it is not the first, to compare human judgments of
compactness for real districting plans with standard measures of compactness for those plans. Of course,
many more experiments are called for. What we have here, however, are encouraging results and a replicable
method.
Regarding question (2), even if an acceptable measure of compactness (or pool of such measures) could
be agreed to, there remain severe problems of application.
The ideal data to estimate [compactness] would contain the geographical coordinates of every
household in the United States, its political district, some measure of distance between any two
households within a state, and a precise definition of communities of interest. This information
is not available. (Fryer, Jr. and Holden, 2011, page 506)
The passage is correct as far as it goes, but it greatly understates the difficulties. At the least, additional
criteria, such as respect for existing political boundaries and geographic features, will often be important.
And arriving at “a precise definition of communities of interest” is an enormous undertaking. The upshot is
that for the foreseeable future we shall be under the condition described at the outset of having only models
that are very inaccurate representations of the underlying problem.
The VSF idea, supported by the empirical findings reported here, affords the third option identified above:
Using an admittedly flawed model to support discussion and deliberation, implementing a modification of an
optimal solution to the model in response to considerations not fully represented in the model. In a nutshell,
the idea is to use the ability to generate a large number of good solutions to constrain the decision process to
a suitably characterized pool, each member of which is reasonably compact and meets the legal requirements
on contiguity and population size. One might set a loose requirement on compactness, perhaps as measured
by several different rules. Evolutionary computation, or indeed any other workable method, could be used to
generate a large consideration set of objectively good quality solutions. Let anyone contribute to this pool,
but limit the consideration set to the pool. This leaves room for a modicum of politics and for incorporation
of other features not incorporated into the computational models, and it secures choice among objectively
good solutions. A regime on this order (further details are needed, of course) could in fact be implemented
by agreement of non-partisan districting boards, where they exist. Other zone design applications—such as
design of sales districts—might follow a similar procedure as well.
In this regard, we note that redistricting problems are normally multi-objective—
Drawing political maps necessarily involves making difficult choices among a number of com-
peting political values. Among these are population equality, representation of minority groups,
geographic compactness and contiguity, respect for the boundaries of other political units at
different spatial scales, continuity with previous district boundary, and (of course) partisan ad-
vantage. . . (Eagles et al., 1999)
—as are zone design problems generally (Sacks, 2000). Yet, often there is (as in the Philadelphia districting
case) a practical impossibility of representing all important aspects of the problem in a single optimization
model, if only for lack of data. By producing a plurality of good solutions to a reasonable optimization
model, we can hope to provide stakeholders with useful grist for the mill of deliberation.
Notes
1After Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts who in 1812 engineered a districting plan in which one of the districts
resembled a salamander. The term “Gerry salamander” was created and soon shortened to “gerrymander” and the name has
stuck.
2Representation of racial minorities, representation of communities of interest or neighborhoods, and holding inviolate
existing political subdivisions are prominent among the issues in reapportionment for which compactness may serve as an
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objective criterion for decision making (Barabas and Jerit, 2004). Also, (Altman, 1997; Altman and McDonald, 2010, 2011)
constitute a very helpful series of general background articles.
3See the working paper by Dopp and Godfrey (2012) for additional visualizations demonstrating problems with standard
measures of compactness for electoral districting.
4Thanks to Ram Gopalan for using classical OR techniques for finding four contiguous seeds. See Chou et al. (2012).
5In all, 107 maps were produced in color. They may be found in a single PDF file at
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/phillydistricts/doc/TeamFred_CompleteMaps.pdf. Each map is identified uniquely.
The correspondence between the map numbers of the experiments and the map identifiers in the PDF file are as follows: map
1, page 7, label Aug27 orig70 s7; map 2, page 89, label Aug27 ram2 s4; map 3, page 32, label Aug27 orig70 s32; map 4, page
94, label Aug27 ram2 s9; map 5, page 88, Aug27 ram2 s3; map 6, page 48, label Aug27 orig70 s48; map 7, page 56, label
Aug27 orig70 s56; map 8, page 65, label Aug27 orig70 s65; map 9, page 19, label Aug27 orig70 s19; map 10, page 10, label
Aug27 orig70 s10; map 11, page 93, label Aug27 ram2 s8; map 12, page 9, label Aug27 orig70 s9; map 13, page 39, label
Aug27 orig70 s39; map 14, page 96, label Aug27 ram2 s11; map 15, page 77, label Aug27 ram1 s7; and map 16, page 4, label
Aug27 orig70 s4.
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